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Municipal Power To Regulate Building
Construction and Land Use by
Other State Agencies
The power of municipalities to enforce their local regulations such as building codes and zoning ordinances
against state agencies operating within their boundaries
has recently been questioned in the courts of a substantial number of states. A vast majority of these courts
have held the agencies exempt from municipal regulation by applying a number of rathermechanicaldoctrines.
The author of this Note examines these doctrines
and compares them with a suggested alternative approach based upon a "balancing of interests." He concludes that little justification exists for either the criteria
used or the results reached in applying these currently
favored doctrines, and that in the absence of statute
conflicts arisingin this area ought instead to be resolved
by balancing competing state and municipalinterests.

INTRODUCTION
[A] point that is difficult to understand is why . .. these [state agencies]
should be able to come in in total ignorance of the desires of a local
community and establish a state building. ... All the rest of the community has to obey the laws, but here is a select group that can totally
ignore [them] and ... do as they see fit.

The occupation of the same territory by a multiplicity of local
governmental units creates intergovernmental conflicts which
until recently have attracted little attention? One of the bitterest
involves the applicability of municipal police regulations such as
building codes, licensing requirements, and zoning or sanitation
ordinances to other governmental agencies operating within the
1. Transcript of Proceedings Before the California Legislative Assembly
Interim Committee on Municipal and County Government-Implications of
the Hall v. City of Taft Decision 40 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hall Legislative Transcript] (testimony of Allan Grimes, city attorney, Modesto, California).
2. See Kneier, The Use of the Police Power by Local Governments and
Some Problems of Intergovernmental Relations, 8 J. PuB. L. 109 (1959). In
1957 there were 8,047 counties, 17,167 municipalities, 17,214 townships,
50,453 school districts, and 14,423 special districts in the United States. Ibid.
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municipality.3 Since municipalities, school districts, counties, and
townships are subdivisions of the state and typically draw their
limited powers from state statute, the legislature controls the distribution of functions to each.4 Few conflicts arise where legislative
grants of power explicitly define jurisdictional boundaries.' However, clear demarcation is atypical - the grants usually are either
silent on the subject, or confer overlapping and apparently inconsistent powers. Thus inadequate legislation has recently led to a
rash of litigation arising from the attempts of municipalities to
enforce their zoning ordinances and building codes against other
state agencies, and of the agencies to obtain immunity to these
regulations.
The courts have employed a variety of rather mechanical
standards to determine which of these competing interests should
prevail. Moreover, they have treated regulation of building construction and zoning differently. With respect to the former, a
slight majority of jurisdictions considering the question have
exempted state agencies from municipal regulation under the
doctrine of "sovereign immunity,"' while a substantial minority
3. Kneier, City-State Conflict in the Use of Municipal Police Power, 50
Ky. L.J. 200 (1961).
There is nevertheless little secondary authority dealing with this problem.
See, however, RHYNE, SuRVEY OF THE LAw OF BuILING CODEs 53 (1960);
Kneler, The Use of the Police Power by Local Governments and Some Problems of Intergovernmental Relations, 8 J. Pu. L. 109-19 (1959); Comment,
The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Use, 39 TEXAS
L. REv. 316 (1991). See also Annot., 61 AL.R.2d 970 (1958); Annot., 39
A.L.R.ed 653 (1954); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 523 (1922).
4. 1 ANTIEAu, MUNIcIPAL CORPoRATION LAw J 2.00 (1963); 2 McQuILuN,
MUNIciPAL CORPORATIONs §§ 4.04-.06, 4.13 (3d ed. 1949); RHYN, MUNCIPA .
LAw § 12-1 (1957).
5. See, e.g., the North Carolina zoning enabling act which provides that
"all of the provisions of this article are hereby made applicable to the erection
and construction of building by the State of North Carolina and its political
subdivisions." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.1 (1964). See also the Oregon zoning statute which authorizes the city council "by ordinance [to] regulate ...
the several classes of public and semipublic buildings . .. ." OR. REv. STAT.
§ 227.230 (1963).
6. See Board of Regents of Univs. v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299, 856 P.2d
399 (1960); Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. Rd 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956) (alternative holding); County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d
160, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1963); Kentucky Institution for Educ. of Blind v. City
of Louisville, 1Q3 Ky. 767, 97 S.W. 402 (1906); Town of Bloomfield v. New
Jersey Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237, 118 A.2d 658 (1955); Kaveny v.
Board of Comm'rs, 69 NJ. Super. 94, 173 A.2d 536 (L. 1961); New Jersey
Interstate Bridge & Tunnel Comm'n v. Jersey City, 93 N.J. Eq. 550, 118;
Atl. 264 (Ch. 1922); Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ., 52 Utah 540, 175 Pac.
654 (1918); City of Charleston v. Southeastern Constr. Co., 134 W. Va. 666,
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have reached the opposite result' through a presumption favoring
the pre-eminence of local "police power."8 Zoning conflicts, on the
other hand, have typically been resolved in terms of a governmental-proprietary dichotomy or by certain implications derived
from the power of eminent domain, either of which results in
immunity in most cases.9
Little justification exists for the mechanical conceptualism embodied in these rules. Consequently, this Note is designed to
develop the thesis that the satisfactory resolution of interjurisdictional conflicts in this area requires an accommodation of
competing interests.o In so doing the currently favored doctrines
will be analyzed and compared with the suggested balancing approach. Since intergovernmental conflicts have almost invariably
arisen in the context of either building construction regulation or
zoning, this Note is devoted to those areas.
I.
A.

BUILDING CONSTRUCTION REGULATION

Ti SOVEREIGN IMVUNITY DocTRIE

The concept of sovereign immunity currently constitutes the
basis for automatically exempting "state agencies" from city
building construction regulations." This doctrine was articulated
64 S.E.2d 676 (1950); City of Milwaukee v. McGregor, 140 Wis. 35, 121 N.W.
642 (1909).
7. See Lavender v. City of Rogers, 232 Ark. 673, 339 S.W.2d 598 (1960)
(by implication); Cook County v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N.E. 512
(1924); Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 252
Iowa 205, 106 N.W.2d 655 (1960); Smith v. Board of Edue., 359 Mo. 264,
221 S.W.2d 203 (1949); Kansas City v. School Dist., 356 Mo. 364, 201 S.W.2d
930 (1947); Kansas City v. Fee, 174 Mo. App. 501, 160 S.W. 587 (1913);
Board of Health v. Charles Simkin & Sons, 10 N.J. Super. 301, 76 A.2d 302
(County Ct. 1950); Port Arthur Independent School Dist. v. City of Groves,
276 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1964).
8. The term "police power" has been used in a variety of different contexts. For the purposes of this Note, police power signifies the source of all
municipal authority to enact ordinances for the general welfare of its inhabitants. It initially resides with the state legislatures, but has been conferred
on local governmental units by express delegation in most states. Since the
power is delegated, the city may exercise it only within the limitations of the
grant. See generally 6 McQunrr, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 24.01-.47.
9. See text accompanying notes 41 & 55 infra.
10. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 Mum. L. REV. 643, 683 (1964).
11. School construction: Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d
574 (1956) [overruling Pasadena School Dist. v. City of Pasadena, 166 Cal.
7, 134 Pac. 985 (1913)]; Kentucky Institution for Edue. of Blind v. City of
Louisville, 123 Ky. 767, 97 S.W. 402 (1906); Board of Edue. v. City of St.
Louis, 267 Mo. 356, 184 S.W. 975 (1916); Kaveny v. Board of Comm'rs, 69
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in the leading case of Hall v. City of Taft, 2 where a municipal
building code was held inapplicable to school construction:' 3
School districts are agencies of the state for the local operation of the
state school system....
... When it engages in such sovereign activities as the construction
and maintenance of its buildings . . . it is not subject to local regulation unless the Constitution says it is or the Legislature has consented
to such regulation.'

Thus, immunity arises under this theory where (1) a state agency
(2) performs a sovereign function (3) without statutory consent
to be regulated locally." Since the existence of state agency and
sovereign function are generally assumed with little discussion,
N.J. Super. 94, 173 A.2d 536 (L. 1961); Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ., 52
Utah 540, 175 Pac. 654 (1918); City of Milwaukee v. McGregor, 140 Wis. 35,
121 N.W. 642 (1909). Hospital construction: City of Atlanta v. State, 181
Ga. 346, 182 S.E. 184 (1935); cf. Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn.
575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956); City of Charleston v. Southeastern Constr. Co.,
134 W. Va. 666, 64 S.E.d 676 (1950). University building programs: Board of

Regents of Univs. v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299, 356 P.2d 399 (1960). County
jail construction:County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App.
Rd 160, 28 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1963). Interstate tunnel construction:New Jersey Interstate Bridge & Tunnel Comm'n v. Jersey City, 93 N.J. Eq. 550, 118 Atl.
264 (Ch. 1922).
Building codes are legal provisions which regulate the materials and
methods used in the construction, repair, and alteration of building structures.
Usually such codes regulate a wide variety of subject matter including height,
wall thickness, fireproofing, vent pipe construction, electrical installation,
safety devices, light, and ventilation. Closely related to building codes are
fire limit laws, set-back ordinances, and health codes. See generally RHYNE,
SURvEY OF THE LAW OF BUILDING CODES (1960).
12. 47 Cal. Rd 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956).
13. Plaintiff-contractor refused to obtain a building permit requiring a $300
fee and submission to defendant city's building ordinance. Defendant halted
plaintiff's construction activity and sought to enforce the penal and civil
provisions of the building code. The court based its decision on the alternative
grounds of sovereign immunity and state preemption of the field through
the exhaustive provisions of the Education Code. In holding that the building
contractor need not secure the permit or remit the fee, the court followed
In re Means, 14 Cal. 2d 254, 93 P.2d 105 (1939). That case established that a
state civil service plumber was immune from a city licensing ordinance since to
hold otherwise would permit the city to add to the requirements for state
employment and restrict the rights of the sovereign.
14. 47 Cal. Rd at 177, 181, 183, 302 P.2d at 574, 577, 578.
15. See cases cited note 6 supra. All three factors must appear implicitly
or explicitly for immunity to result. See, e.g., Parking Authority v. City of
Trenton, 40 NJ. 251, 191 A.2d 289 (1963), in which the court found the
parking authority's function to be local and not sovereign, and consequently
denied immunity to the city's building code. And see Modesto Irr. Dist. v.
City of Modesto, 210 Cal. App. 2d 652, 27 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1962) (express
statutory consent in grant to city waives immunity). See also Watson Constr.
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the statutory consent requirement is ordinarily determinative in
applying this doctrine. The requisite "consent" generally is not
found unless the grant of power to the state agency specifically
subordinates the agency to municipal regulation, or the grant of
municipal power expressly authorizes control of state building
construction. Since explicit provisions are rare,' the usual result
of applying the immunity doctrine is to prohibit local regulation
without inquiring into the intensity of the competing interests.
The immunity doctrine is merely a canon of statutory construction - a State will be presumed not to have conferred upon
its municipalities the power to regulate other state agencies absent
clear manifestation of a legislative intention to do so. 17 The presumption of immunity is apparently premised on the view that
municipalities have but minimal interest in the building programs
of other state agencies,' and that the successful and efficient
execution of these programs in accordance with state-wide standards requires unfettered state control.' Yet this rationale begs
the fundamental questions at issue: (1) the extent to which the
Co. v. City of St. Paul, 260 Minn. 166, 109 N.W.2d 382 (1961) (waiver found
in state contract requiring builder to comply with permit ordinance).
16. CAL. Gov' CODE § 53091 provides that "each local agency shall comply with all applicable building ordinances ... of the county or city in which
the territory of the local agency is situated." CAL. Gov'T CODE J 53090 defines local agency as not including "the State, a city, a county . . . ." Cf. N.C.
GEN. STAT. & 160-181.1 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.280 (1963). See also
Modesto Irr. Dist. v. City of Modesto, supra note 15; Watson Constr. Co. v.
City of St. Paul, supra note 15.
17. See Kentucky Institution for Educ. of Blind v. City of Louisville, 128
Ky. 767, 774-75, 97 S.W. 402, 404 (1906). See also Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 581-85, 292 S.W.2d 777, 779-81 (1956).
18. See Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 181, 302 P.2d 574, 577 (1956);
In re Means, 14 Cal. 2d 254, 259, 93 P.2d 105, 108 (1939); City of Atlanta v.
State, 181 Ga. 346, 348, 182 S.E. 184, 185 (1935); City of Milwaukee v.
McGregor, 140 Wis. 35, 37, 121 N.W. 642 (1909). In Salt Lake City v. Board
of Educ., 52 Utah 540, 549-50, 175 Pac. 654, 657 (1918), the court asserted
that the city possessed no significant interest in school fire prevention since
"every one knows" that schools are not located in business districts or densely
populated areas. Apparently the danger to pupils within the building did not
justify "stringent regulations."
19. In Board of Regents of the Univs. v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299, 311,
356 P.2d 399, 406-07 (1960), the court reasoned that
... the powers, duties and responsibilities assigned and delegated to a
state agency performing a governmental function must be exercised free
of control or supervision by a municipality within whose corporate
limits the state agency must act .

...

A central, unified agency, re-

sponsible to State officials rather than to the officials of each municipality . .. is essential to the efficient and orderly administration of a
system of higher education .

...
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successful performance of a particular "sovereign activity"20 requires uniform state control unaffected by municipal regulation,
and (2) the magnitude of municipal interest in the manner in
which a particular agency program is pursued. Moreover, it errs
in assuming a hierarchy among governmental units in which
bodies such as school districts and counties are "agents of the
state," and thereby cloaked with state sovereignty, while municipal corporations are something less. This assumption is indefensible. Since the municipality also derives its powers from legislation it should have an equal claim to pre-eminence. Thus, the
immunity doctrine reasonably supports a conclusion that the
municipality, as well as the other governmental unit involved, is
an immunized "state agency."2
It would seem that resolution of conflicts over the application
of municipal building regulations ought to depend in each case
upon whether the factors favoring the uniform, central regulation
of a particular sovereign activity outweigh those which favor
giving effect to the local regulation involved. Thus, emphasis
should be placed upon the relative availability and efficiencies of
state and local regulatory machinery, and the extent to which
compliance with the city's requirements will prejudice the other
agency's programs and vice versa 2 For example, vesting complete control of school construction in state-wide agencies may
See also Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ., supra note 18, in which the
court said that exclusive state regulation of school building construction was
essential to control costs so that school authorities could effectively plan and
allocate facilities with limited tax resources. 52 Utah at 550, 175 Pac. at
657-58.
20. The determination of those activities which are sovereign and therefore immune is inherently difficult. Seasongood, Municipal Corporations:
Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 92 VA. L. REv. 910,

915-17 (1936). The assertion that public school construction is a "sovereign"
activity only postpones the inevitable inquiry into the meaning of "school
construction" for this purpose. See Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ., supra
note 18, in which an ordinance requiring the use of fireproof material in constructing public buildings was held an invalid interference with a sovereign
activity, while a similar ordinance requiring the installation of fire alarms or
a firephone system was upheld.
01. See Sandalow, supra note 10, at 682-83.
22. Arguably the immunity doctrine does make possible a definitive delineation of jurisdictional boundaries and thereby restricts future litigation. It
is doubtful, however, that intergovernmental harmony necessarily results.
But see Kaveny v. Board of Comm'rs, 71 NJ. Super. 244, 247, 176 A.2d 802,
804 (App. Div. 1962), -holding the inspection provisions of a building code
inapplicable to school construction: "To permit Montclair .

.

. to graft its

own building code onto the legislative requirements would be to introduce
a potential element of discord and confusion into an area where the public
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well contribute to the furtherance of equal educational opportunities, adequate financial planning,'" and a uniformly high level of
safety?' However, to the extent that this is true, it is because
school construction is typically the subject of comprehensive state
regulation by agencies possessing considerable competence in
dealing with the specialized problems inherent in school construe2
tion?"
Nevertheless, this example does not justify the broad,
interest is today so strong . . . ." See also Board of Regents of Univs. v. City
of Tempe, 88 Aris. 299, 310 n.1, 856 P.2d 399, 406 n.1 (1960), 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 903, 907 & n.20 (1961).
23. It has been suggested that even where the desirability of maintaining minimum standards favors a central control exempt from local interference, local jurisdictions should be empowered to enforce ordinances setting
higher standards, i.e., to impose supplemental regulation. To the extent that
a state agency could not foresee in advance every need of each municipality
the suggestion is not without merit. However, insofar as local supplementary
regulations appreciably increase costs, the state's interest in controlling the
allocation and use of its fiancial resources should prevail. See 6 CALI. AssEMBy INTERIM CoAm. ON MuNICPAL AND CouNTY GOVEIMENT, PROBLEMS
or LocAL GovEmNmNT RESULTING FROM THE HALT V. CITY OF TAFT CASE
DECISION, No. 8, at 18-14 (1959).

24. A number of state legislatures have reached this conclusion. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 367(8) (1958), vesting authority in the state building
commission to promulgate and enforce minimum standards of construction
for all "schoolhouses," and ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 367(11) (1958), prohibiting
counties and municipalities from applying their building codes to public
schoolhouses. See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 58091, which broadly immunizes
school districts acting under the State Contract Act from county and city
building ordinances. (Pursuant to the State Contract Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 14250-424, school districts almost always operate under the act.)
The legislative history of the California provisions reveals that the primary
considerations underlying the immunization of school districts from municipal
building regulations were (1) the extensive and rigid state control of school
construction, (2) the need for statewide uniformity "in order to attain a high
level of safety," and (3) the antiquity of more than two-thirds of the municipal codes in the State. However, the principal witnesses also revealed a pronounced reluctance to extend immunity to state agencies other than school
districts. The level of state control was cited as the factor distinguishing
school construction from the activities of other state agencies. Accordingly,
the principal witnesses recommended that immunity be granted only to school
districts. 6 CALIp. AssEAMLY INTERmr CoMm. oN MUNICIPAL AN CouT
GovERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 23; Hall Legislative Transcript 40.
25. See Kaveny v. Board of Comm'rs, 71 N.J. Super. 244, 245, 176 A.2d
802, 803-04 (App. Div. 1962); New Jersey Interstate Bridge & Tunnel Comm'n
v. Jersey City, 93 NJ. Eq. 550, 555-56, 118 Atl. 264, 267 (Ch. 1922); cf. 109
U. PA. L. REv. 903, 906 n.13 (1961), arguing that the arbitrary nature of the
sovereign immunity doctrine is not offensive in an area such as standards for
school construction, which involves only a choice between agencies of presumptively equal competence.
Moreover, the existence of antiquated local building codes may justify
subordinating them to effective state regulation. See, e.g., 6 CALIF. ASSEMBLY
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indiscriminate sweep of the immunity doctrine. Insofar as the
doctrine immunizes a number of other agencies from local regulation for which the state provides no alternative," it creates areas
of completely unregulated building construction activity. Even
where state regulation exists, it may be relatively ineffective in
comparison with the municipal regulation which it pre-empted. 7
Not only is the sovereign immunity doctrine analytically untenable, but it yields desirable results only where overriding considerations of uniformity, central control, and fundamental state
interests would compel a similar solution. This approach, arbitrarily ignoring the underlying competing considerations, provides
at best an unsatisfactory answer to a problem that ought to be
resolved by a fair balancing of interests.
B.

Tim PoucE PowER APPRoAcH

An ever-increasing number of decisions in this area have held
that a municipality is authorized to regulate another state
agency's building construction activities within its territorial
limits where the power to do so has not been expressly withdrawn
by the legislature. The jurisdictions adopting this rule have subINTERIM CoiMM. oN MuNIcnAL AND CouNTY GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note
23, at 12, where testimony revealed that only 30% of California municipalities
possessed adequate codes.
26. See, e.g., In re Means, 14 Cal. 2d 254, 93 P.2d 105 (1939), where the
municipality was denied the right to enforce a licensing ordinance against a
state-employed plumber, notwithstanding a total absence of state regulation
of plumbing standards.
27. In 6 CAHiF. AssEmLy INTRmui Comm. ON MUNIcIPAL AND CoUNEY
GOVETmENT, op. cit. supra note 23, at 9-12, concern was voiced that the
sovereign immunity doctrine had precluded school districts from a substantial
amount of desirable local building inspection assistance in the more populous
metropolitan areas. Testimony also revealed that the state division of architecture, charged with the inspection responsibility, was too understaffed to
carry out a similar quality of detailed electrical and mechanical inspection.
It is significant to note that pursuant to the recommendations of the principal
witnesses to (1) limit the immunity doctrine to school construction, (2) empower municipalities to enforce reasonable supplemental construction regulations, (3) provide for state delegation of their inspection function to local
jurisdictions having adequate inspection facilities, and (4) authorize school
districts to require contractors to obtain municipal building permits, the
legislature enacted CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 53090-92, providing for the limited
application of local -building codes and the power to delegate inspection responsibilities to local jurisdictions.
28. See Lavender v. City of Rogers, 232 Ark. 673, 339 S.W.2d 598 (1960)
(contractor for school district must obtain permit); Cook County v. City of
Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N.E. 512 (1924) (county jail construction); Cedar
Rapids Community School Dist. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 252 Iowa 205, 106
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stituted for the presumption of sovereign immunity" the contrary
presumption that the legislature intended municipal police power
to reach the other state agencies as well as private parties. These
decisions have held that unless municipal power to regulate other
state agencies is withdrawn expresslyo or by implication from
specific grants of power to the other agencies, it is effective as
to all building construction within the municipality if exercised
reasonably-that is, so as not to interfere unduly with the
state agency's performance of its responsibilities.3 2 Since express
N.W.2d 655 (1960) (school plumbing and heating); Smith v. Board of Educ.,
359 Mo. 264, 221 S.W.2d 203 (1949) (school restaurant subject to city sanitation laws); Kansas City v. School Dist., 356 Mo. 364, 201 S.W.2d 930 (1947)
(city may collect boiler inspection fee); Kansas City v. Fee, 174 Mo. App.

501, 160 S.W. 537 (1913) (school janitor must obtain city license); Board of
Health v. Charles Simkin & Sons, 10 N.J. Super. 301, 76 A.2d 302 (County
Ct. 1950) (master plumber on school project subject to city license law); Port
Arthur Independent School Dist. v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.2d 330 (Tex.
1964) (school district must obtain permit and comply with local building
code); of. Community Fire Protection Dist. v. Board of Educ., 315 S.W.2d
873 (Mo. App. 1958) (school district must obtain permit to construct). RHYNE,
SuRVEY oF TH LAW OF BumIG CODES 55 (1960), asserts that these cases
are "well reasoned."
29. One of the most forceful rejections of sovereign immunity appears in
Kansas City v. Fee, 174 Mo. App. 501, 505-11, 160 S.W. 537, 588-40 (1913),
where the court said:
To say that the board, in order to be left wholly free to carry on its
work of education, must . .. be absolutely free from all matters of
purely police regulation is to say that the board cannot attend to the

work of education unless it is allowed to violate .. . such regulations.
The absurdity of such a statement is its own refutation ....
... Under [the school board's] view of the case the school district,
merely 'because it is a quasi political entity of itself, is supreme in its
control over its real estate, and is not subject to any [city] regulations

[T]he result of such theory would be to create little separate and
independent kingdoms within the city where the sovereignty given to
it by the state could not operate ....
30. Of. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53090, in which the State, cities, counties and
certain rapid transit districts are exempted from municipal and county build-

ing codes and zoning ordinances.
31. The Missouri courts have frequently held that portions of the municipal police power have been withdrawn through a specific legislative grant
to another state agency. See Board of Educ. v. City of St. Louis, 267 Mo.
356, 362-63, 184 S.W. 975, 976-77 (1916); Community Fire Protection Dist.

v. Board of Educ., 315 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Mo. App. 1958); Wellston Fire Protection Dist. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 282 S.W.2d 171, 174-76 (Mo. App.

1955).
32. Among the factors going to reasonableness are the extent to which
the legislature has generally occupied the field and the relative availability

and adequacy of state and local regulatory facilities. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids
Community School Dist. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 252 Iowa 205, 207-08,
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withdrawal is rare the police power approach tends to accommodate municipal regulation, just as the immunity doctrine favors
state interests.
This approach appears to be analytically sound and helpful. By
treating the municipality and other state agencies as state subdivisions of equal status, 33 it avoids the artificial hierarchy of
agencies imposed by the immunity doctrine. And the presumption
that municipal police power controls, rebuttable only on a showing that it has been withdrawn or exercised unreasonably, seems
justifiable. The police power is regarded as one of the most fundamental and least limitable of governmental powers, based upon
the overriding necessity for public self-protection." In exercising
it municipalities have broad authority to safeguard the health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of their inhabitants by reasonable regulations.33 Building codes are designed to achieve these
ends through the close regulation of minimum standards for new
construction. Since other state agencies charged with narrower
statutory responsibilities may not be reliable self-regulators in this
area of intense local interest,36 it may reasonably be inferred in
the absence of express statutory provision that these agencies
were not intended to pre-empt the municipal police power. Since
210-11, 106 N.W.2d 855, 658-59 (1960); Smith v. Board of Educ., 859 Mo.
264, 267-68, 221 S.W.2d Q03, 204-05 (1949); Kansas City v. School Dist., 856
Mo. 364, 869-70, 201 S.W.2d 930, 933-34 (1947); Community Fire Protection
Dist. v. Board of Educ., supra note 31, at 874-75; Port Arthur Independent
School Dist. v. City of Groves, 876 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. 1964). Some courts
have also considered the magnitude of conflicting state and local interests in
the particular activity sought to be regulated. See, e.g., Kansas City v. School
Dist., supra at 370-71, 201 S.W.2d at 934; Kansas City v. Fee, 174 Mo. App.
501, 506-07, 511, 160 S.W. 537, 538-89 (1913); Board of Health v. Charles
Simkin & Sons, 10 N.J. Super. 301, 302-03, 76 A.Qd 302, 303-04 (County Ct.

1950); City of Groves v. Port Arthur Independent School Dist., 366 S.W.Qd
849, 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), af'd, 376 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1964).
33. See, e.g., Community Fire Protection Dist. v. Board of Educ., supra
note 31, at 877.
84. 6 McQuimw, op. cit. supra note 4, M§24.09-.10.
35. Id. M§24.38, .52.
36. A state agency will doubtless erect a generally "safe" building whether
or not it is locally regulated, since its officials presumably care for the welfare
of all citizens. Yet safety in general terms is not at stake. Building codes require specific materials and methods. Since the agency usually has a limited
budget, compliance with exacting code standards may be sacrificed to considerations of economy. Insofar as a city's engineers and architects have determined that only certain materials and methods are safe enough to cope
with particular fire dangers in their city, installation of lower quality materials
becomes "unsafe." Safety is thus a matter of degree and a modern code is
presumptively the most authoritative source of what is safe for the city which
promulgates it.
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municipal regulations which interfere unduly with the performance of agency functions are unenforceable,37 the minority approach effectively accommodates both the state interest in the
promotion of statewide matters and the municipal interest in
regulating matters of legitimate local concern.
II. ZONING
Pursuant to constitutional or legislative authorization, virtually all American municipalities, and many counties and townships,
have enacted zoning ordinances to eliminate the evils inherent in
haphazard urban development. However, realization of this objective may be frustrated even where the ordinance is held valid 8 if
another state agency is exempted from its application." A vast
majority of courts hold the zoning ordinance inapplicable to the
state and its agents in reliance either on a theory of limited immunity, or on one of complete immunity conferred via the grant
37. See cases cited at note 82 supra.See also Kneier, The Use of the Police
Power by Local Governments and Some Problems of Intergovernmental Relations, 8 J. PuB. L. 109, 118 (1959).
88. The general rule since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 865 (1926), is that reasonable, comprehensive zoning is valid if it bears
a substantial relation to the promotion or protection of public health, safety,
morals, comfort, or general welfare. A valid ordinance involves a reasonable
balancing of opposing public and private interests. E.g., Shepard v. Village
of Skaneateles, 800 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949). Due process and equal
protection may not be violated. E.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. Town of Atherton, 60 Cal. App. 2d 268, 140 P.2d 678 (1943); Heath
v. Mayor & City Council, 187 Md. 296, 49 A.2d 799 (1946). However zoning
ordinances are presumed to be valid absent a showing that they are arbitrary
or unreasonable. E.g., Lockard v. Los Angeles, 88 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 8
(1949). See generally 8 McQuna,
op. cit. supra note 4, M 25.05, 25.18-.31.
89. Where a zoning municipality seeks to ignore its own ordinance and
establish a prohibited use, a variety of approaches parallel to those applied
to interjurisdictional conflicts are followed to determine the propriety of this
practice. Most courts immunize "governmental" activities, but not those
deemed "proprietary." See, e.g., Water Works Bd. v. Stephens, 262 Ala. 203,
78 So. 2d 267 (1955); Baltis v. Village of Westchester, 8 Ill. 2d 888, 121 N.E.2d
495 (1954); Nehrbas v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d
211, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957). Other courts recognize an immunity derived
from the grant of the power of eminent domain. See, e.g., Mayor of Savannah
v. Collins, 211 Ga. 191, 84 S.E.2d 454 (1954); cf. State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp,
830 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960). Absolute exemption predicated on a sovereign
immunity theory has been found in a few cases. See, e.g., Balthasar v. Pacific
Elec. Ry., 187 Cal. 302, 202 Pac. 37, 19 A.L.R. 452 (1921).
For a criticism of this authority see Comment, 89 TEXAs L. Rrv. 316,
317-22 (1961). See also 1 ANTIEAu, op. cit. supra note 4, § 7.11; 8 McQuOmN,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 25.15.
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of eminent domain power.4 0 Critical examination is required to
determine whether application of either theory provides an adequate, justifiable resolution of conflicting interests.

A.

LuMTED MMIUTY

The currently prevailing view is that state agencies are entitled
to immunity from municipal zoning regulations, in the absence
of consent to be governed by them, where the proposed use constitutes a "governmental" rather than a "proprietary" function.4 '
Governmental functions are those required by legislative mandate
and involving a direct benefit to the general public, while an
activity conferring private advantages pursuant to permissive
40. See 1 ANTIxAu, op. cit. supra note 4, § 7.11; 8 McQunrLnt, op. cit.
supra note 4, § 25.15; 1 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING ch.
31 (1962).
A number of cases, rejecting the favored theories, have resolved the jurisdictional conflict through statutory construction. In Town of Sheridan v.
Valley Sanitation Dist., 137 Colo. 315, 324 Pad 1038 (1958), and Application
of Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 125 A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1956),
the courts found express language in the statutory grants to the agencies
which conditioned exemption, in the Colorado case, on the zoning city's consent to the proposed location and, in the New Jersey case, on a showing of
reasonable necessity. Other courts have construed less specific jurisdictional
grants as conferring exemption from otherwise applicable zoning restrictions.
See, e.g., In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. S58, 173 A.Qd 233 (1961).
But see DeGaynor v. Board of Trustees, 363 Mich. 428, 109 N.W.2d 777
(1961); City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d
641 (1958). Governmental units have also been immunized by the existence
of an express exemption in the zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Lees v. Sampson
Land Co., 372 Pa. 126, 92 A.2d 692 (1952).
41. See, e.g., Lauderdale County Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, 269 Ala. 79,
110 So. 2d 911 (1959) (operation of county bus barn, governmental); Jefferson
County v. City of Birmingham, 256 Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d 196 (1951) (operation
of sewage disposal plant, proprietary); Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control
Bd. v. City of Birmingham, 253 Ala. 402, 44 So. 2d 593 (1950) (liquor sales,
governmental); County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App.
2d 160, 28 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1963) (construction of county buildings inside city,
governmental); City of Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School Dist.,
254 Iowa 900, 119 N.W.2d 909 (1963) (location of bulk gasoline tank, governmental); City of Medford v. Marinucci Bros., 344 Mass. 50, 181 N.E.2d
584 (1962) (erection of hoppers incidental to interstate highway construction,
governmental); Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777
(1956) (construction of hospital, governmental); Salt Lake County v. Liquor
Control Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 235, 357 P.2d 488 (1960) (liquor store, governmental); City of Charleston v. Southeastern Constr. Co., 134 W. Va. 666, 64
S.E.2d 676 (1950) (state office building construction, governmental); Green
County v. City of Monroe, 3 Wis. 2d 196, 87 N.W.2d 827 (1958) (jail, governmental).
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legislation is proprietary.42 Thus, the placement of a county jail,"'
a bulk gasoline tank," or a hospital building" is a governmental
function, while the operation of a county sewage disposal plant
is proprietary. 6
One difficulty with the governmental-proprietary distinction is
that its vagueness makes it virtually impossible to apply.4 7 But
aside from this, the criteria to be used in applying it are of questionable validity. It is true that they reflect an apparently reasonable assumption as to probable legislative intent - that in the
absence of clear expression to the contrary municipalities are not
empowered to thwart the state or its agencies in performing a
duty required by statute, but that when such agencies voluntarily
42. E.g., Merrill v. City of Wheaton, 879 Ill. 504, 41 N.E.2d 508 (1942);
Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 NJ. 578, 141 A.2d 808
(1958) (concurring opinion); O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgh, 289 App. Div.
555, 268 N.Y. Supp. 173 (1933), af'd, 266 N.Y. 582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935); City
of Amarillo v. Ware, 120 Tex. 456, 40 S.W.2d 57 (1981).
48. Green County v. City of Monroe, 8 Wis. 2d 196, 87 N.W.2d 827 (1958).
44. City of Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School Dist., 254
Iowa 900, 119 N.W.2d 909 (1963).
45. E.g., Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.qd 777
(1956).
46. E.g., Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 256 Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d
196 (1951).
47. For example, one jurisdiction has been unable to decide whether
refuse collection is a governmental or a proprietary function. See O'Brien v.
Town of Greenburgh, 289 App. Div. 555, 268 N.Y. Supp. 178 (1983), aff'd,
266 N.Y. 582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935) (proprietary); Hewlett v. Town of Hempstead, 8 Misc. 2d 945, 133 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 1 App. Div. 2d
954, 150 N.Y.Sad 922 (1954) (governmental). There is also considerable disagreement among jurisdictions. See Baltis v. Village of Westchester, 3 Ill. Rd
388, 121 N.E.2d 495 (1954) (water storage facilities, proprietary); McKinney
v. City of High Point, 287 N.C. 66, 74 SE.2d 440 (1953) (water storage, governmental). A few cases persuasively reject the test. See State ex rel. Askew
v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960), in which the court asserted that "the
[inter-jurisdictional issue] . . . will be answered by ascertaining the legislative
intent . . . and is not to be resolved simply by applying the 'governmental vs.
proprietary' test." Id. at 887. See also Township of Washington v. Village of
Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 141 A.2d 308 (1958) (distinction illusory: all authorized functions are performed as a government, not as entrepreneur); City of
Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958);
Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. Rtv. 910 (1986). A factor that may mitigate the
difficulties inherent in making the distinction is recent authority which implies that the statutory designation of a function as either governmental or
proprietary determines its classification for zoning purposes. See Nichols
Eng'r & Research Corp. v. State, 59 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1952) (construction of
incinerator, governmental). However a classification for tort purposes is not
binding in zoning situations. See Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 256
Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d 196 (1951).
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exercise their private rights as corporate bodies seeking gain, they
should be subject to the same restrictions as private corporations
conducting similar business. 48 However this assumption may be
too broad. It seems reasonable to infer that the legislature never
intended to permit the frustration of functions required of state
agencies by statute. But, to conclude that it intended to preclude
the application of zoning regulations to every governmental function of a state agency is to assume the conclusion that performance of governmental functions would otherwise be significantly
obstructed in each case. Moreover, since municipalities are also
state agencies performing a governmental function (zoning), the
governmental-proprietary analysis is as reversible in favor of the
municipalities as is its counterpart in building code cases, the
sovereign immunity doctrine.4 9
These factors seem to require a balancing of conflicting interests. From a municipality's viewpoint, the uncontrolled placement
of a prison or sewage disposal plant in a residential area obviously
tends to damage it aesthetically and thus to diminish property
values and tax revenue. The result of such an invasion is to impair
the municipality's capacity to plan and administer effectively its
future development. On the other hand, if state agencies are bound
by zoning restrictions, they may experience great difficulty in
locating necessary but unwanted facilities in reasonably desirable
areas.50
Legislative guidelines for balancing these conflicting interests
may be available. In conferring broad zoning power, the legislature has implicitly recognized a fundamental local interest in
48. See, e.g., City of .Bloomfield v. Davis County Community School Dist.,
254 Iowa 900, 904, 119 N.W.2d 909, 911 (1963).
49. See text accompanying note 21 supra. While a few of the building
code cases utilize a governmental-proprietary analysis, e.g., City of Charleston
v. Southeastern Constr. Co., 134 W. Va. 666, 64 S.E.2d 676 (1950), most do
not consider the distinction. Building regulation is generally assumed to be
a "sovereign" or "governmental" function. See, e.g., Hall v. City of Taft, 47
Cal. 2d 177, 802 P.d 574 (1956).
50. See 6 CALzw. ASSEELY INTEmi CoaM. oN MuIcrPAL AD CoUWrY
GoVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 2S, at 15, where Deputy Attorney General
Perry testified that the Director of Education requested the Attorney General
to appear in Town of Atherton v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 2d 417, 324
P.2d 328 (1958), and argue that if a city or county could regulate placement
of public schools by zoning, they could exclude all schools from within their
respective urban areas. See also the testimony of William Siegal, representing
the County Supervisors Association of California, who noted that prior to
Hall v. City of Taft, supra note 49, the metropolitan counties were "having
particular difficulty locating certain types of undesirable and unwanted facilities such as [jails] ... ." 6 CAIFw. ASSEMBLY INTmm CoLiM. oN MuxcAL
AND CoWNTY GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 23, at 19.
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zoning objectives. 5 ' Thus, to the extent that an effective zoning
system requires unqualified municipal jurisdiction,5 2 the zoning
ordinance should govern the activities of other state agencies
absent an express withdrawal of municipal jurisdiction. While the
other agencies are typically charged with relatively narrow statutory responsibilities, municipalities invariably bear responsibility
for a wide variety of interests. For example, while it is doubtful
that school authorities consider the city's zoning interests when
locating a school, it is likely that a municipality gives broadminded consideration to the question of school location in enacting a comprehensive zoning scheme. Since it is reasonable to
presume that the legislature intended a balanced viewpoint to
control in cases of conflict, it would seem that an agency's power
to conduct a state function is not a license to disregard local
zoning restrictions, but authorization to operate in accordance
with them."3 This construction, when accompanied by the power
of the state agency, like any private landowner, to challenge an
unreasonable ordinance" or seek its amendment, accommodates
municipal interests without unduly interfering with agency performance of statutory responsibilities. Furthermore, since the
legislature has failed to deal explicitly with this area, it seems
justifiable to place upon it the burden of reversing a reasonable
presumption as to what its intent would be.
B.

COMPLETE OR EMINENT DoIAiN

LMmuNITY

There is authority for the proposition that state agencies
possessing the right to condemn property under a power of eminent domain are by virtue of that fact, exempt from zoning regu51. See City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d
641, (1958).
52. See 6 CALu. ASSEMBLY INTIm Comm. oN MuNICIPAL AND COUNTY
GovummwT, supra note 23, at 16, where counsel for the League of California
Cities characterized state agency immunity as "a license to frustrate city
planning and zoning efforts and depress property values." He asserted that
without "power to control all land uses, [the cities] cannot effectively control
any ... . Planning and zoning can be effective only if done by a single body
within a given area, and to diffuse the authority . . . is to prevent its successful use." Ibid.
53. Accord, City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 686,
101 S.E.2d 641, 646-47 (1958).
54. See Union Free School Dist. v. Village of Hewlett Bay Park, 979 App.
Div. 618, 107 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1951) (school district may sue to attack validity
of zoning ordinance). See 8 McQumsr, MIumcIPAL CORPORATIONs § 25.292
(Sd ed. 1949), for the general rules as to the proper parties to proceedings for
relief against zoning. But see 47 CALiF. L. REv. 171, 173 (1959), where it was
argued that a school district's proprietary interest is but conjectural.
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lations." In each case the significant consideration is the right to
condem and not whether the property in question was in fact
condemned.1Most courts passing on the question hold that the
only limitation on the power of eminent domain and the immunity
conferred by its possession is that the property be used for a
proper public purpose. 7 While the cases contain little analysis,
immunity usually seems to be predicated on an assumption that
the power of eminent domain necessarily embraces the power to
use as well as to take. It is reasoned that if zoning restrictions were
applicable, the zoning municipality could limit the public uses for
the furtherance of which the legislature purposely conferred the
55. See City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637
(1962) (city sewage plant, located extra-territorially, immune from zoning of
situs city); Reber v. South Lakewood Sanitation Dist., 147 Colo. 70, 362
P.2d 877 (1961) (county ordinance inapplicable to sanitation district); Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker, 368 Ill. 442, 14 NE.2d 490 (1938) (park district
not subject to city ordinance); State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.Wad 882
(Mo. 1960) (sewage disposal plant exempt from county zoning); State ex rel.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss, 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1957) (school
district not subject to city zoning); Aviation Services v. Board of Adjustment,
20 N.J. 975, 119 A.2d 761 (1956) (municipal airport exempt from township
ordinance); Town of Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 18 NJ.
287, 113 A.2d 658 (1955) (highway authority exempt from town zoning ordinance); State ez rel. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107
N.E.d 345, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 865 (1952) (state turnpike authority exempt from city zoning law); State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of Comm'rs, 37
Ohio Op. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (C.P. 1947), af'd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d
694 (1948) (county airport not subject to city zoning plan). But see St. Louis
County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1962) (city sewage plant
subject to county zoning ordinance).
56. E.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, supra note 55; Mayor of
Savannah v. Collins, £11 Ga. 191, 84 S.E.2d 454 (1954).
57. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, supra note 55 (by
implication); Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker, 368 Ill. 442, 14 N.E.2d 490
(1938); State en rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 88e (Mo. 1960); State ex rel.
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss, 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1957) (by implication); Town of Bloomfield v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 18 N.J. 237,
113 A.2d 658 (1955); State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of Comm'rs, 37 Ohio Op.
58, 79 N.E.9d 698 (C.P. 1947), aff'd, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694 (1948).
Many of these courts expressly reject a governmental-proprietary limitation
which would allow exemption for an agency exercising eminent domain only
if its function were governmental. See, e.g., State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp,
supra; Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 141
A.2d 308 (1958). But see City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, supra note
55, at -099, 368 P.2d at 640 (dissenting opinion) and Township of Washington
v. Village of Ridgewood, supra at 586, 141 A.2d at 312 (dissenting opinion)
where it was strenuously argued that the power of eminent domain should
not create immunity per se absent the performance of a governmental
function.
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power of eminent domain." However, to infer from possession of
the power of eminent domain that the legislature intended to permit unfettered condemnation and use is as unwarranted as the
inference that the legislature intended to preclude all local regulation of "governmental" functions.
CONCLUSION
The problems considered in this Note can best be resolved by
explicit legislative definition of jurisdictional boundaries." However, absent such treatment it would seem that the courts should
attempt to balance the conflicting interests rather than to resolve
inter-jurisdictional conflicts through the mechanical application
of questionable presumptions which fail to take account of the
existence and magnitude of these interests. Whether the conflict
involves smoke abatement, the placement of parking meters, or
any other subject as to which state agencies may oppose city
regulation, the interests at stake on each side are similar. The city
invariably seeks enforcement of its ordinances to protect its inhabitants' health, safety and welfare, while the agency desires
immunity to facilitate the performance of its statutory responsibilities. Balancing these interests in any particular case primarily
requires an examination of their relative intensities. To the extent
that local regulation of an activity is vital to the promotion of
municipal objectives more fundamental than those served by
exempting it, the local regulation should prevail. In determining
relative intensities of interests, the degree to which municipal
58. For the most forceful expression of this reasoning, see State ex rel.
Helsel v. Board of Comm'rs, supra note 57. See also State ex rel. Askew v.
Kopp, supra note 57; Aviation Servs. v. Board of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275,
119 A.2d 761 (1956).
59. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, f§ 367(8), (11) (1958), explained supra note
24; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.1 (1964), which makes local zoning regulations
applicable to the erection and construction of buildings by the State and its
agencies; ORE. REV. STAT. § 297.230 (1963), authorizing city regulation of public buildings; CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 58090-91, requiring state agency compliance
with local building and zoning ordinances, but for all practical purposes immunizing school districts from both; and the U.S. DEPT. OF CoMERcE AnvisoRY Cozm. oN ZONING, STATE STANnn ZONING ENABLiNG AcT § 9
(Rev. ed. 1926), establishing the pre-eminence of local zoning ordinances.
Indiana recently enacted legislation, held constitutional in Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan. Comm'n, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E.2d 220 (1957), which in effect
creates a rebuttable presumption that any state agency activity inconsistent
with a municipality's comprehensive zoning plan is not in the public interest.
This solution appears to be highly desirable insofar as it recognizes fundamental local zoning interests while protecting whatever overriding state interests are found to exist. In. AN. STAT. § 53-936 (1964).
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regulation will interfere with the performance of the agency's
functions should be considered. Another consideration is whether
the activity in question requires uniform, central control, or per-

mits local individualized attention. Also pertinent would be the
relative availability and effectiveness of state and local regulatory
machinery. Regardless of the difficulties inherent in a balancing
approach, the formulation of judicial decisions on the basis of an
examination of all the relevant considerations would at least
produce presumptively fairer results 0 as well as encourage cooperation and negotiation between the competing governmental
units.

60. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 MbNu. L. REv. 643, 683 (1964), suggesting a balancing
approach as the "most likely approach to achieving an appropriate solution."
However, it is also noted that as to some issues, the courts have little competence to balance competing interests. Ibid.
Courts faced with a jurisdictional conflict case may extract helpful balancing guidance from the few state legislatures that have enacted statutory
solutions, despite an apparent lack of agreement among these states as to
which agencies are to be regulated and to what extent. Of those state legislatures which appear to have considered the application of zoning ordinances
to local state activity, whatever consensus exists definitely favors municipal
zoning interests. This trend is diametrically opposed to the prevailing judicial
majority. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.1 (1964) and ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 227.230 (1963), discussed in note 59 supra,which authorize the application of
local zoning regulations to state or public buildings. And see IND. AN. STAT.
§ 53-936 (1964), discussed in note 59 supra, which establishes a rebuttable
presumption favoring the application of zoning laws in all cases, as well as
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 53091-94, which requires uniform compliance with local
zoning law, with only limited exceptions, notably counties and school districts.
As to the application of municipal building codes, the Alabama solution, discussed in note 24 supra,bars all local regulation of state buildings and schoolhouses, whereas the California provisions, while appearing to allow some local
regulation, effectively limit its scope so as to bar local control over any significant state construction activity.

